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CRIMINAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Legislative intent.
The legislature intended to exclude actions of
peace officers in the course of their duties from

the category of intrusions that may be lawfully
resisted. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah
1991).
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of costs.
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PARTl
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
76-3-101. Sentencing

in accordance with chapter.

(1) A person adjudged guilty of an offense under this code shall be sentenced
in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
(2) Penal laws enacted after the effective date of this code shall be classified
for sentencing purposes in accordance with this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-101, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-101.

Compiler's Notes. - The effective date of
the Criminal Code was July 1, 1973.

COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.-21Am.
§ 525.

Jur. 2d Criminal Law

76-3-102. Designation

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1461.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e.. 1206(3).

of offenses.

Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-102.
COLLATERALREFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 28 to 30.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 9.
Key Numbers. -Criminal Lawe.. 27.

76-3-103. Felonies classified.
(1) Felonies are classified into four categories:
(a) Capital felonies;
(b) Felonies of the first degree;
(c) Felonies of the second degree;
(d) Felonies of the third degree.
(2) An offense designated as a felony either in this code or in another law,
without specification as to punishment or category, is a felony of the third
degree.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-103.

51

76-3-104

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

§ 29.

76-3-104.

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 10, 12.
27.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

Mi~demeanors classified.

(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three categories:
(a) Class A misdemeanors;
(b) Class B misdemeanors;
(c) Class C misdemeanors.
(2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this code or in another
law, without specification as to punishment or category, is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-104, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-104.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060

(D. Utah 1987).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d.-21Am.
§ 30.

76-3-105.

Jur. 2d Criminal Law

C.J.S. - 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 11.
27.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

Infractions.

(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-105, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-105.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060

(D. Utah 1987).
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PART2
SENTENCING
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed
- Definitions - Civil penalties - Restitution Hearing - Aggravation or mitigation of crimes
with mandatory sentences - Resentencing.
AB used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of _property taken,
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings
and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, including insured damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation.
(e) (i) ''Victim" means any person whom the court determines has
suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
(ii) ''Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's
criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(g) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law
to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty.
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
(1)
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitution up
to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or victims of
the offense of which the defendant has been convicted, or to the victim
of any other criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the
sentencing court.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(b) (i) When a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title
77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and
is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which he has been
returned, the court may, in addition to any other sentence it may
impose, order that the defendant make restitution for costs expended
by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court
shall consider the criteria in Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution
that is complete, partial, or nominal under this subsection, the court shall
take into account:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of
restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) (i) When the court determines that restitution is appropriate or
inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons
for the decision a part of the court record.
(ii) The court shall send a copy of its order of restitution to the
Division of Finance.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full
hearing on the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of
governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent
failure to appear warrant issued for an infraction;
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
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(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported;
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or
presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to
the time set for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence
introduced at the sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the
Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice.
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been sentenced and
committed to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of
the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the
sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if he had not previously been
sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater than the initial
sentence nor less than the mandatory time prescribed by statute.
(ii) The resentencing provided for in this section shall take into
consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section
by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served.
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the
record at the time of sentencing.
(ii) The court shall also inform the defendant as part of the
sentence that if the defendant is released from prison he may be on
parole for a period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping,
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall
be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This
subsection takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-201, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-201; 1979, ch. 69, § 1;
1981, ch. 59, § 1; 1983, ch. 85, § 1; 1983, ch.
88, § 3; 1984, ch. 18, § 1; 1986, ch. 156, § 1;
1987,ch.107,§ 1;1990,ch.81,§ 1;1992,ch.
142,§ 1;1993,ch.17,§
1;1994,ch.13,§
19.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsections (l)(e) and (f) and redesignated former
Subsection (l)(e) as (l)(g); subdivided Subsection (4)(d); substituted "takes precedence over"
for "supersedes" in Subsection (6)(c); and made
stylistic changes throughout the section.
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1, 1993,
added Subsection (1), redesignating the following subsections accordingly; subdivided Subsection (3); substituted present Subsection
(4)(a)(ii) for former language requiring the
court to consider the criteria in Subsection
(3)(b) and to make the reasons for its decision a
part of the court record; deleted language relating to transportation of a defendant from Subsection (4)(b)(i); substituted "Subsection (c)"for
"Subsection (3)(b)" and deleted two sentences
now comprising Subsection (4)(d) in Subsection

(4)(b)(ii); inserted "under this subsection" in
Subsections (4)(c) and (4)(d); deleted former
Subsection (4), defining terms; added Subsection (5); subdivided Subsections (7)(a) and
(7)(b); and made stylistic changes.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Subsection (4)(c)" for "Subsection
(c)" throughout Subsection (4) and in Subsection (7)(a)(i) substituted "Board of Pardons and
Parole" for "Board of Pardons."
Commission on
Cross-References.
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, § 63-25-1 et
seq.
Division of Finance, § 63A-3-101 et seq.
Removal of officers,§ 77-6-1 et seq.
Restitution as condition of probation, § 7718-1.
Sentence, judgment and commitment, Rule
22, R.Crim.P.
Special release from city or county jail, purposes, conditions and limitations, § 77-19-3 et
seq.
Uniform misdemeanor fine/bail schedule,
Code of Judicial Administration, Appx. C.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
section is not unconstitutionally vague. State v.
Gerrish, 746 P.2d 762 (Utah 1987).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Aggravating factors.
-Bodily injury to victim.
-Severity of offense.
Arrest record.
-Effect on sentence.
Credit for pretrial detention.
Discretion of court.
Informal procedure.
Life without parole.
-Prospective application.
Mitigating factors.
Probation.
Restitution.
-Death of defendant.
-Enforcement.
-Improper award.
-Nature.
-Payee.
-"Pecuniary damages."
-Purposes.
-Right to challenge.
-To insurance company.
-To law enforcement agency.
- Victim not named in information.
Review.
Statement of reasons for sentence.
Cited.

Aggravating factors.
-Bodily injury to victim.
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who
pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in
considering the fact that the victim suffered
substantial bodily injury as an aggravating
circumstance. State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297
(Utah 1993).
-Severity of offense.
When the trial judge considered the severity
of the offenses "together with" additional aggravating factors, any error in citing the severity of
the offenses as an aggravating factor was
harmless. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188 (Utah
1990).
Arrest record.

Constitutionality.
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme
set forth in Subsections 76-5-404.1(4), 76-3406(1), and 77-27-9(2) and Subsection (5) of this
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-Effect on sentence.
Defendant's view that the trial judge was
unduly influenced by defendant's arrest record
in imposing concurrent sentences of up to five
years for two counts of aggravated assault was
purely speculative, particularly in light of
unanimous recommendations of the prosecutor
and the Departments of Corrections and Adult
Probation and Parole that defendant receive a
prison sentence. State v. McKenna, 728 P.2d
984 (Utah 1986).

PUNISHMENTS

Credit for pretrial detention.
Defendant's request that the trial court order
that credit be given for the period of time he
spent in pretrial detention was outside the
limits prescribed and therefore beyond the
court's power, since the power to reduce or
terminate sentences is exclusive with the
Board of Pardons. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985).
Discretion of court.
When the statute under which the defendant
is convicted mandates imposition of one of
three stated minimum terms, trial courts have
discretion to weigh the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the presumptive term of
middle severity in order to arrive at a just
sentence. State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909 (Utah
1988).
Informal procedure.
This section contemplates a comparatively
informal procedure. State v. Bell, 754 P.2d 55
(Utah 1988).
Life without parole.
-Prospective application.
There was no obligation that the state accord
retroactive effect to new substantive statutes
providing for a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole to allow a convicted person
sentenced to death the benefit of the new statute provisions. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp.
659 (D. Utah 1992).
Giving a convicted person sentenced to death
a more stringent life sentence without parole
when at the time of the crime the penalty, if
death were not imposed, would be life with the
chance of parole would violate the ex post facto
clause. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659 (D.
Utah 1992).
Mitigating factors.
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who
pied guilty to first degree murder, child kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
trial court erred in not considering the defendant's age as a mitigating circumstance. State
v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993).
Probation.
The probationary time period imposed by the
court may be longer than the maximum time of
imprisonment authorized for commission of the
offense. State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d 1119
(Utah 1977).
Restitution.

76-3-201

-Enforcement.
Court has authority under this section to
maintain bench probation to enforce the payment of restitution, even if the resulting probation period would be longer than the maximum
formal probation period for the offenses involved. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
award.
-Improper
Restitution under this section was unwarranted because the traffic offense of an improper lane change did not involve criminal
intent and was not determined to be the proximate cause of the victims' injuries. State v.
Robinson, 860 P.2d 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
-Nature.
The state can enforce restitution as both a
condition of probation pursuant to § 77-181(8), and as a separate and independent component of the court's judgment and the defendant's original sentence under this section and
§ 76-3-201.1(1). The expiration of the court's
jurisdiction to require payment of restitution as
a condition of probation, therefore, does not
diminish the enforceability of restitution as an
independent component of the sentence decreed in the judgment. State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d
1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
-Payee.
Although this section authorizes restitution
to the "victim," restitution may be ordered to
the Crime Victims' Reparations Trust Fund
when the victim has already received reparations from the fund. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d
979 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
- "Pecuniary damages."
The term "pecuniary damages" as defined in
this section includes misappropriated insurance policy payments even though the victims
did not suffer losses during the time they were
uninsured. State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
-Purposes.
The restitution statute contemplates penal
as well as compensatory purposes and the court
is required to consider the rehabilitative effect
as one of the criteria of the restitution determination; thus, the court's restitution formula
may consider punitive and rehabilitative purposes. State v. Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992).
-Right to challenge.
Defendant waived the right to challenge the
order of restitution, where he lodged no objection to the imposition, amount or distribution of
the restitution ordered, did not request a hearing on the issue, and focused only upon the
merits of his candidacy for probation, contend-

-Death of defendant.
Defendant's death when an appeal was pending from his conviction for failure to pay taxes
did not abate the conviction and a restitution
order was unaffected. State v. Christensen, 866
P.2d 533 (Utah 1993).
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ing that freedom would enhance his ability to
make restitution. State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417
(Utah 1987).
The defendant was not afforded the "full
hearing" to which he was entitled to object to
the imposition of restitution when the court
impermissibly used Rule 1101 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence to bar the defendant from
presenting witnesses on his behalf. Rule 1101 is
intended to loosen the formality of the hearing,
not prevent the hearing of evidence. State v.
Starnes, 841 P.2d 712 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

-'lb insurance company.
The court did not exceed its authority in
ordering the defendant, convicted of intentionally, willfully, and maliciously committing arson upon his house, to reimburse insurance
companies for their loss in compensating the
bank which acquired the house through foreclosure. State v. Stayer, 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 1985).
-'lb law enforcement agency.
Police department was not entitled to reimbursement, as a "medical expense," for an examination of a sexual assault victim. State v.
Depaoli, 835 P.2d 162 (Utah 1992).
A police agency was a victim under this
section, as it suffered pecuniary damages resulting from defendant's criminal activity, and
thus was entitled to the restitution of its "buy
money." State v. Garcia, 866 P.2d 5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993).
-Victim not named in information.
The court did not err when it ordered defendant to pay restitution for treatment of a victim
of defendant's criminal conduct even though

defendant had not been charged with any offense involving that person. State v. Simonette,
247 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Review.
The Supreme Court does not disturb a sentence unless it exceeds that prescribed by law
or unless the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986).
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal
unless the trial court has abused its discretion.
State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
Statement of reasons for sentence.
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances
and the trial court's reasons supporting the
sentence should appear on the record. State v.
Bell, 754 P.2d 55 (Utah 1988).
The trial court, in imposing a minimum mandatory sentence, is required to (1) identify the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and
(2) state the reasons for whichever minimum
mandatory sentence is imposed. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133 (1989).
Trial court fully complied with the procedures required by this section when it identified the mitigating and aggravating circumstances prior to sentencing, and made clear the
reason for the sentence of middle severity: the
aggravating circumstances did not outweigh
the mitigating circumstances. State v. Elm, 808
P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
Cited in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291
(Utah 1988); State v. Lorrah, 761 P.2d 1388
(Utah 1988); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987
(Utah 1989); State v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah
1989).

COLLATERALREFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Child Sexual Abuse
Cases, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 443.
Recent Developments in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Criminal Law, 1989 Utah L.
Rev. 207.
Binding Sentencing Guidelines: A Means of
Controlling Utah's Prison Population, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 309.
Brigham Young Law Review. - Testing
the Limits of the Court's Exclusive Jurisdiction
in Fraud Cases: Discharge vs. Criminal Restitution, 1984 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 61.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 589.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1458,
1459.
A.L.R. - Comment note - Length of sen-
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tence as violation of constitutional provisions
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, 33
A.L.R.3d 335.
Propriety of conditioning probation or suspended sentence on defendant's refraining from
political activity, protest, or the like, 45
A.L.R.3d 1022.
State court's power to place defendant on
probation without imposition of sentence, 56
A.L.R.3d 932.
Consideration of accused's juvenile court
record in sentencing for offense committed as
adult, 64 A.L.R.3d 1291.
Restitutional sentencing under Victim and
Witness Protection Act, § 5 (18 USCS §§ 3579,
3580), 79 A.L.R. Fed. 724.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®=> 1205.
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76-3-201.1. Nonpayment of fine or restitution as contempt
- Imprisonment - Relief where default not
contempt - Collection of default.
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make restitution defaults
in the payment of any installment, the court on motion of the prosecution,
victim, or upon its own motion may require him to show cause why his default
should not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show cause citation
or a warrant of arrest for his appearance.
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his default was not attributable to an
intentional refusal to obey the order of the court or to a failure on his part to
make a good faith effort to make the payment, the court may find that his
default constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the fine or
the restitution, or a specified part of it, is paid.
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is imposed on a corporation or
unincorporated association, the person authorized to make disbursement from
the assets of the corporation or association shall pay the fine or make the
restitution from those assets. His failure to do so may be held to be contempt
unless he makes the showing required in Subsection (2).
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment of fines or
failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the commitment order.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the default in the
payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt, the court may enter an order
allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of
the payment or of each installment, or revoking the fine or order of restitution
or the unpaid portion in whole or in part.
(6) (a) A default in the payment of a fine or costs or failure to make
restitution or any installment may be collected by any means authorized
by law for the enforcement of a judgment.
(b) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in behalf of a
victim.
(c) The levy of execution for the collection of a fine or restitution does
not discharge a defendant committed to imprisonment for contempt until
the amount of the fine or restitution has actually been collected.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201.1, enacted by L.
1979,ch. 69, § 2; 1983, ch. 262, § 3; 1987, ch.
107, § 2.

Cross-References. Chapter 32.

Contempt, Title 78,

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Restitution.
The state can enforce restitution as both a
condition of probation pursuant to § 77-181(8),and as a separate and independent component of the court's judgment and the defendant's original sentence under Subsections 763-201(3) and (5) and Subsection (1) of this
section. The expiration of the court's jurisdic-
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tion to require payment of restitution as a
condition of probation, therefore, does not diminish the enforceability of restitution as an
independent component of the sentence decreed in the judgment. State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d
1203 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, 853
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
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Civil action by victim for damages.

(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not limit or impair the
right of a person injured by a defendant's criminal activities to sue and recover
damages from the defendant in a civil action. Evidence that the defendant has
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or Section 77-18-1, may
not be introduced in any civil action arising out of the facts or events which
were the basis for the restitution. However, the court shall credit any
restitution paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in favor of
the victim in the civil action.
(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the issue of a
defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil
action.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-201.2, enacted by L.
1979,ch.69,§ 3;1989,ch.187,§ 4;1990,ch.
163, §§ 4, 5.

76-3-202.

Paroled persons - Termination or discharge
from sentence - Time served on parole - Discretion of Board of Pardons and Parole.

(1) Every person committed to the state prison to serve an indeterminate
term and later released on parole shall, upon completion of three years on
parole outside of confinement and without violation, or in the case of a person
convicted of violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(1)(e), Section
76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404,
76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those sections, upon
completion of ten years on parole outside of confinement and without violation,
be terminated from his sentence unless the person is earlier terminated by the
Board of Pardons and Parole. Any person who violates the terms of his parole,
while serving parole, shall at the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole
be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term as
determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole, but not to exceed the
maximum term.
(2) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation may not be
discharged from his sentence until either:
(a) he has served three years on parole outside of confinement and
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of violating Section
76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(1)(e), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405,
or attempting to violate any of those sections, ten years on parole outside
of confinement and without violation;
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or
(c) the Board of Pardons and Parole so orders.
(3) (a) All time served on parole, outside of confinement and without
violation constitutes service of the total sentence but does not preclude the
requirement of serving a three-year or ten-year, as the case may be, parole
term outside of confinement and without violation.
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(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement after commission
of a parole violation does not constitute service of the total sentence unless
the person is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the parole.
(c) Any time spent in confinement awaiting a hearing before the Board
of Pardons and Parole or decision by the board concerning revocation of
parole constitutes service of the sentence. In the case of exoneration by the
board, the time spent shall be included in computing the total parole term.
(4) When any parolee without authority from the Board of Pardons and
Parole absents himself from the state or avoids or evades parole supervision,
the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the parole period.
(5) This section does not preclude the Board of Pardons and Parole from
paroling or discharging an inmate at any time within the discretion of the
Board of Pardons and Parole unless otherwise specifically provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-202, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-202; 1983, ch. 88, § 4;
1989, ch. 125, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 20.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, in Subsection (1)
inserted "76-5-403" in the first sentence and
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" throughout the section.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Board of Pardons, not the trial court, had
authority to grant defendant credit for the time
he served prior to conviction. State v. Alvillar,
748 P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Authority of trial court.
Parole hearings.
~Due process.
Cited.

Parole hearings.

Constitutionality.
Former Section 76-1-34, providing that time
during which prisoner was temporarily released and at large would not be computed as
part of time served upon prisoner's return to
confinement, was not unconstitutional; Board
of Pardons' refusal to allow credit for time
served in Texas and Nevada while resisting
extradition to Utah, after reversal of decision
releasing defendant from prison, was in accord
with the former law. Andrus v. Turner, 29 Utah
2d 338, 509 P.2d 363 (1973).
Authority of trial court.
Defendant's request that the trial court order
that credit be given for the period of time he
spent in pretrial detention was outside the
limits prescribed and therefore beyond the
court's power, since the power to reduce or
terminate sentences is exclusive with the
Board of Pardons. State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d
264 (Utah 1985).

-Due process.
It was not a violation of an inmate's due
process or double jeopardy rights for the Board
of Pardons to refuse to grant him credit for time
served as a condition of probation. Rawlings v.
Holden, 869 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 244 Utah Adv. Rep. 56 (Utah 1994).
In original parole grant hearings at which
predicted terms of incarceration are determined, fundamental principles of due process
under Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 7 require that
the inmate know what information the Board of
Pardons will be considering at the hearing and
that the inmate know soon enough in advance
to have a reasonable opportunity to prepare
responses and rebuttal of inaccuracies. Curtis
v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 870 P.2d 958 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994).
Cited in Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am.Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 622.

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1579.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ®"' 1216(1).
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Felony conviction - Indeterminate term of imprisonment - Increase of sentence if firearm
used.

A person who has been convicted of a felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree, for a term at not less than
five years, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may be
for life but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and the court
may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not concurrently;
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm
or a facsimile or the representation of a firearm was used in the
commission or furtherance of the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently;
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term not to exceed
five years but if the trier of fact finds a firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for a
felony in which a firearm was used or involved in the accomplishment of
the felony and is convicted of another felony when a firearm was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in addition to any other
sentence imposed, be sentenced for an indeterminate term to be not less
than five nor more than ten years to run consecutively and not concurrently.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-203; 1976, ch. 9, § 1;
1977, ch. 88, § 1; 1983, ch. 88, § 5.
. Cross-References. - Bill of attainder forbidden, Utah Const., Art. I, § 18.
Certain criminals ineligible to vote, Utah
Const., Art. IY, § 6.

Prisoners not to be treated with unnecessary
rigor, Utah Const., Art. I, § 9.
Witnesses in prison, Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 45(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Applicability

ANALYSIS

Applicability of section.
-Aggravated robbery.
E;ffect of incarceration.
Firearm enhancement.
Notice.
Cited.

of section.

-Aggravated
robbery.
The plain meaning of this section, after its
amendment in 1976, is that all convicted felons
are subject to the statute's provisions. Nothing
in the 1975 amendment of§ 76-6-302, which
defines "aggravated robbery," shields that fel-
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ony from the effect of the enhancement provision enacted in 1976. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d
188 (Utah 1990).

Effect of incarceration.
A convict could be tried and sentenced for
criminal offense committed in trying to escape
from state prison, though trial and sentence
were had before term of imprisonment had
expired; person detained for one felony could be
prosecuted criminally for another. People v.
Flynn, 7 Utah 378, 26 P. 1114 (1891).
Firearm enhancement.
Information need not state that the enhanced
penalty for use of a firearm will be applied upon
conviction;it is sufficient ifit alleges either that
defendant is being charged under this section
or that a firearm was used in the commission of
the offense. State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah
1978).
It is not required that a specific and separate
finding of use of a firearm must be made in
order to impose the enhanced penalty for use of
a firearm in the commission of a felony. State v.
Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).
The increased penalty for use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony does not impose
double punishment for the same criminal act
nor does it create a separate offense that must
be pled as a separate charge. State v. Angus,
581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978).
The total maximum enhancement sentence
that a court may impose for use of firearms in
first and second degree felonies is five years;
therefore, trial court did not have authority to
impose two consecutive enhancement sentences, one for one year and another for five
years, for a total of six years, upon defendant's
guilty plea to second degree murder involving
use of a firearm. State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601
(Utah 1984).
, A mandatory one-year minimum enhancement sentence must be imposed for use of a
firearm in cases involving first and second
degree felonies. In such cases, the judge's only
discretion lies in sentencing for more than one
year but not more than five years. State v.
Cobb,774 P.2d 1123 (Utah 1989).
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing a five-year enhanced sentence, after
finding that defendant had deliberately armed

76-3-203

himself and had committed previous offenses
involving violence. State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123
(Utah 1989).
This section does not limit the firearm enhancement to only one enhancement for all
crimes arising out of a single criminal episode.
State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
The legislature's 1975 amendment of the
aggravated robbery statute to specify use of a
firearm, coupled with the subsequent enactment of the general sentence enhancement provisions, created no ambiguity over what penalty the legislature intended for robbery
committed with a firearm. The legislature was
merely increasing the degree of a robbery committed with the enumerated instruments of
violence. State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990).
A court may impose the five-year firearm
penalty only where a defendant has first been
sentenced in a firearm felony case and then is
convicted of another firearm felony. State v.
Ewell, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Ct. App. 1993).
Because there was no evidence consistent
with the jury's determination of guilt that could
possibly suggest a firearm had not been used in
the commission of the offense, any error that
might have been made by not instructing the
jury to make a separate and specific finding of
firearm use was harmless. State v. Labrum, 246
Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Notice.
The enhancement statute is merely part of
the penalty, and adequate notice is given if the
information alleges either that the enhancement statute may apply or that a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense. State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988).
Where a probable cause statement, as part of
the information, alleged that a firearm was
used in the commission of the offense charged,
defendant had legally sufficient notice as required by State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah
1978). State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
Cited in State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264
(Utah 1985); State v. Rodriguez, 718 P.2d 395
(Utah 1986); Lancaster v. Cook, 780 P.2d 1246
(Utah 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Binding Sentencing
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's
Prison Population, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 309.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. J ur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 604.

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1458.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <S= 1208(6).
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Offenses committed by three or more persons
- Enhanced penalties.

(1) (a) A person who commits any offense listed in Subsection (4) in concert
with two or more persons is subject to an enhanced penalty for the offense
as provided below.
(b) "In concert with two or more persons" as used in this section means
the defendant and two or more other persons would be criminally liable for
the offense as parties under Section 76-2-202.
(2) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint in misdemeanor cases or
the information or indictment in felony cases notice that the defendant is
subject to the enhanced penalties provided under this section. The notice
shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the substantive
offense charged.
(b) If the subscription is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to include
the subscription if the court finds the charging documents, including any
statement of probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the
allegation he committed the offense in concert with two or more persons,
or if the court finds the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the omission.
(3) The enhanced penalties for offenses committed under this section are:
(a) If the offense is a class B misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 90 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(b) If the offense is a class A misdemeanor, the convicted person shall
serve a minimum term of 180 consecutive days in a jail or other secure
correctional facility.
(c) If the offense is a third degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of three years in prison.
(d) If the offense is a second degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of six years in prison.
(e) If the offense is a first degree felony, the convicted person shall be
sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of nine years in prison.
(f) If the offense is a capital offense for which a life sentence is imposed,
the convicted person shall be sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years in
prison.
(4) Offenses referred to in Subsection (1) are:
(a) any criminal violation of Title 58, Chapter 37, 37a, 37b, or 37c,
regarding drug-related offenses;
(b) assault and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 1;
(c) any criminal homicide offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 2;
(d) kidnapping and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 3;
(e) any felony sexual offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4;
(f) sexual exploitation of a minor as defined in Section 76-5a-3;
(g) any property destruction offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 1;
(h) burglary, criminal trespass, and related offenses under Title 76,
Chapter 6, Part 2;
(i) robbery and aggravated robbery under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3;
(j) theft and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 4;
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(k) any fraud offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 5, except Sections
76-6-503, 76-6-504, 76-6-505, 76-6-507, 76-6-508, 76-6-509, 76-6-510, 766-511, 76-6-512, 76-6-513, 76-6-514, 76-6-516, 76-6-517, 76-6-518, and
76-6-520;
(1) any offense of obstructing government operations under Part 3, Title
76, Chapter 8, except Sections 76-8-302, 76-8-303, 76-8-304, 76-8-307,
76-8-308, and 76-8-312;
(m) tampering with a witness or other violation of Section 76-8-508;
(n) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding as defined in
Section 76-8-509;
(o) any explosives offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 3;
(p) any weapons offense under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 5;
(q) pornographic and harmful materials and performances offenses
under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12;
(r) prostitution and related offenses under Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 13;
(s) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 15, Bus Passenger Safety
Act;
(t) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 16, Pattern of Unlawful
Activity Act;
(u) communications fraud as defined in Section 76-10-1801;
(v) any violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 19, Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Reporting Act; and
(w) burglary of a research facility as defined in Section 76-10-2002.
(5) (a) This section does not create any separate offense but provides an
enhanced penalty for the primary offense.
(b) It is not a bar to imposing the enhanced penalties under this section
that the persons with whom the actor is alleged to have acted in concert
are not identified, apprehended, charged, or convicted, or that any of those
persons are charged with or convicted of a different or lesser offense.
(c) The sentencing judge rather than the jury shall decide whether to
impose the enhanced penalty under this section. The imposition of the
penalty is contingent upon a finding by the sentencing judge that this
section is applicable. In conjunction with sentencing the court shall enter
written findings of fact concerning the applicability of this section.
(6) The court may suspend the imposition or execution of the sentence
required under this section if the court:
(a) finds that the interests of justice would be best served; and
(b) states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition on the
record and in writing.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203.1, enacted by L.
1990, ch. 207, § 1; 1994, ch. 12, § 108.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amend-

ment, effective May 2, 1994, corrected the reference in Subsection (l)(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
of the enhanced penalty as it was obliged to do
under this section, failure of defendant to object
to the enhancement precluded consideration of
the issue on appeal. State v. Labrum, 246 Utah
Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

ANALYSIS

Findings of fact.
Mental state of parties.

Findings of fact.
Even though the trial court did not make
written findings of fact concerning applicability

Mental state of parties.
For this section to apply, a defendant must
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act in concert with two or more persons who
would be criminally liable as parties under
§ 76-2-202. Party liability under § 76-2-202
does not require that the persons involved in

76-3-203.2.

the criminal conduct have the same mental
state. State v. Alvarez, 872 P.2d 450 (Utah
1994).

Definitions - Use of firearm in offenses committed on or about school premises - Enhanced
penalties.

(1) (a) "On or about school premises" as used in this section and Section
76-10-505.5 means any of the following:
(i) in a public or private elementary, secondary, or on the grounds of
any of those schools;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under
Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; and
(v) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included
in Subsections (l)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).
(b) As used in this section:
(i) "Educator" means any person who is employed by a public school
district and who is required to hold a certificate issued by the State
Board of Education in order to perform duties of employment.
(ii) "Within the course of employment" means that an educator is
providing services or engaging in conduct required by the educator's
employer to perform the duties of employment.
(2) Any person who, on or about school premises, commits any offense and
uses or threatens to use a firearm in his possession in the commission of the
offense is subject to an enhanced degree of offense as provided in Subsection
(4).

(3) (a) Any person who commits an offense against an educator when the
educator is acting within the course of employment is subject to an
enhanced degree of offense as provided in Subsection (4).
(b) As used in Subsection (3)(a), "offense" means an offense under Title
76, Chapter 5, Offenses Against The Person; and
(c) an offense under Title 76, Chapter 6, Part 3, Robbery.
( 4) The enhanced degree of offense for offenses committed under this section
are:
(a) if the offense is otherwise a class B misdemeanor it is a class A
misdemeanor;
(b) if the offense is otherwise a class A misdemeanor it is a third degree
felony;
(c) if the offense is otherwise a third degree felony it is a second degree
felony; or
(d) if the offense is otherwise a second degree felony it is a first degree
felony.
(5) The enhanced penalty for a first degree felony offense of a convicted
person:
(a) shall be imprisonment for a term of not less than five years and
which may be for life, and imposition or execution of the sentence may not
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be suspended unless the court finds that the interests of justice would be
best served and states the specific circumstances justifying the disposition
on the record; and
(b) shall be subject also to the firearm enhancement provided in Section
76-3-203 except for an offense committed under Subsection (3) that does
not involve a firearm.
(6) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned,
shall provide notice upon the information or indictment that the defendant
is subject to the enhanced degree of offense or penalty under Subsection (4)
or (5). The notice shall be in a clause separate from and in addition to the
substantive offense charged.
(b) If the notice is not included initially, the court may subsequently
allow the prosecutor to amend the charging documents to include the
notice if the court finds the charging document, including any statement of
probable cause, provide notice to the defendant of the allegation he
committed the offense on or about school premises, or if the court finds the
defendant has not otherwise been substantially prejudiced by the omission.
(7) In cases where an offense is enhanced by a degree pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), (b), (c), or (d), or under Subsection (5)(a) for an offense committed
under Subsection (2) that does not involve a firearm, the convicted person shall
not be subject also to the firearm enhancement contained in Section 76-3-203.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203.2, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 101, § 1; 1994, ch. 134, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added Subsections
(l)(b) and (3); added the exception at the end of
Subsection (5)(b); inserted "or under Subsection
(5)(a) for an offense committed under Subsection (2) that does not involve a firearm" in
Subsection (7); and made related stylistic
changes.

76-3-203.3. Penalty
tion.

Compiler's Notes. - Laws 1992, ch. 102
also enacted a § 76-3-203.2; that section was
renumbered as § 76-3-203.3 by the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 101
became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

for hate crimes -

Civil rights viola-

AB used in this section:
(1) "Primary offense" means those offenses provided in Subsection (5).
(2) A person who commits any primary offense with the intent to
intimidate or terrorize another person or with reason to believe that his
action would intimidate or terrorize that person is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(3) "Intimidate or terrorize" means an act which causes the person to
fear for his physical safety or damages the property of that person or
another. The act must be accompanied with the intent to cause a person to
fear to freely exercise or enjoy any right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the state or by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(4) (a) The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is
returned, shall provide notice on the complaint in misdemeanor cases
that the defendant is subject to a third degree felony provided under
this section. The notice shall be in a clause separate from and in
addition to the substantive offense charged.
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(b) If the notice is not included initially, the court may subsequently allow the prosecutor to amend the charging document to
include the notice if the court finds:
(i) that the amended charging documents, including any statement of probable cause, provide notice that the defendant is
subject to a third degree felpqy provided under this section; and
(ii) that the defendant has not otherwise been substantially
prejudiced by the amendment.
(5) Primary offenses referred to in Subsection (2) are the misdemeanor
offenses for:
(a) assault and related offenses under Sections 76-5-102, 76-5102.4, 76-5-106, 76-5-107, and 76-5-108;
(b) any misdemeanor property destruction offense under Sections
76-6-102, 76-6-104, and 76-8-714, and Subsection 76-6-106(1)(b);
(c) any criminal trespass offense under Sections 76-6-204 and
•
76-6-206;
(d) any misdemeanor theft offense under Section 76-6-412;
(e) any offense of obstructing government operations under Sections 76-8-301, 76-8-302, 76-8-304, 76-8-305, 76-8-307, 76-8-308, and
76-8-313 and Subsections 76-8-306(1)(a) through (f) and 76-8-310(1);
(f) any offense of interfering or intending to interfere with activities of colleges and universities under Title 76, Chapter 8, Part 7;
(g) any misdemeanor offense against public order and decency as
defined in Title 76, Chapter 9, Part 1;
(h) any telephone abuse offense under Title 76, Chapter 9, Part 2;
(i) any cruelty to animals offense under Section 76-9-301; and
(j) any weapons offense under Section 76-10-506.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-203.2, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 102, § 1; recompiled as 76-3-203.3.
Compiler's Notes. - This section was enacted as § 76-3-203.2; it was renumbered by
the Office of Legislative Research and General

Counsel because of the enactment at the same
session of another § 76-3-203.2.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 102
became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Legislative Violence
Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 1994 Utah L.
Rev. 209.
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Misdemeanor
ment.

conviction

-

Term of imprison-

A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to
imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one
year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six
months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety
days.
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-204, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-204.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Utah 1987).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1458.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 1208(1).

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 604.

76-3-205. Infraction conviction
disqualifi.ca tion.

-

Fine, forfeiture,

and

(1) A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be
subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination.
(2) Whenever a person is convicted of an infraction and no punishment is
specified,the person may be fined as for a class C misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-205, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-205.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060
(D. Utah 1987); State v. Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091
(Utah 1988).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 604.

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1458.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law e=> 1208(1).

76-3-206. Capital felony - Penalties.
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of a capital felony shall
be sentenced in accordance with Section 76-3-207. That sentence shall be
death, life imprisonment, or, on or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without
parole.
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to
automatic review by the Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is
extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State
Supreme Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme
Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance
with rules promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-206, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-206; 1977, ch. 84, § 1;
1992, ch. 142, § 2.
Amendment Notes. - The 1992 amendment, effectiveApril 27, 1992, in Subsection (1),
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inserted "pied guilty to or"; substituted "or, on
or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without
parole" for "as the court or jury, in accordance
with this section, shall determine"; and made
related stylistic changes.
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Cross-References. - Appeals to Supreme
Court for death sentence imposed, procedure,
Rule 26, R. Crim. P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Appeals.
Prerequisites to execution.
Record.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
Utah's death penalty is constitutional. State
v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (1988).
Appeals.
On direct appeal in capital cases, Supreme
Court will review an error, even though no
proper objection was made at trial and even
though the error was not raised on appeal, if
the error was manifest and prejudicial; in reviewing the imposition of the death penalty,
Supreme Court has the duty to determine
whether the sentence of death resulted from
error, prejudice or arbitrariness, or was disproportionate. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341,
74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
Supreme Court will review errors raised on
appeal in death penalty cases, eve_nthough ~o
proper objection was made at trial, but will
reverse a conviction based upon such errors
only if they meet the manifest and prejudicial
error standard. In addition, the court has the
power to notice manifest ("palpable") error apparent in the record and correct a conviction
based upon the error if the error is prejudicial,
even though it was not objected to at trial or
assigned on appeal. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d
546 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671
(1994).
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality
review was not required in regard to defendant's contention that his sentence of death
was disproportionate to the crime committed,
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the
sentences meted out in other first-degree murder cases. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987), cert. denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994).
While Utah law does not compel a defendant
sentenced to death to utilize every procedure
that a defendant might voluntarily invoke, the
law does require one automatic appeal even
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when "the defendant has chosen not to pursue
his own appeal." State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1989).
Trial court committed plain error when after
finding that the aggravating circumstances
outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, it concluded that the
death penalty should be imposed, without deciding whether, based on all the circumstances,
the death penalty was justified and appropriate
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Holland,
777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989).
Over time, as the Supreme Court becomes
aware of a general pattern in the imposition of
the death penalty in this state, the court may
set aside death sentences that fall outside the
general pattern and thus reflect an anomaly in
the imposition of the death penalty. But that
does not mean that a defendant is entitled as a
matter of course to determine how the capital
sentencing scheme has been administered generally by trying to compare the facts and circumstances of capital cases on a case-by-case
basis. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989).
Prerequisites to execution.
Execution of criminal defendant may not
occur until the Supreme Court determines at
least that the sentence is in accord with lawful
process. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989).
Record.
Given the procedures required at trial and
the careful appellate review given by the Supreme Court to death penalty cases over the
years, a specification of reasons by the sentencing authority on the record for imposing the
death penalty, even if it were practicable, is not
necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious
sentences. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1989).
There is no constitutional right to a perfect
transcript. Rather, criminal defendants have
the right to a record of sufficient completeness
to permit proper consideration of their claims.
State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220 (Utah 1992).
Cited in State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986); State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Recent Developments
in Utah Law - Judicial Decisions - Criminal
Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 137.
Brigham Young Law Review. - The
Jury's Role in Capital Cases is Immune From

Judicial Interference, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 639.
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 609.
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Key Numbers. - Criminal Law¢'> 1219.

76-3-207. Capital felony - Sentencing

proceeding.

(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital
felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue
of sentence. In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing
proceedings shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by a
jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant has been found guilty of
a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury
which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing
before the jury, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. If,
however, circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the
same jury for the sentencing proceedings the court may dismiss that jury and
convene a new jury for such proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing
proceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court,
the sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (4).
(2) In sentencing proceedings regarding a capital offense, evidence may be
presented as to any matter the court deems relevant to the sentence, including
but not limited to the nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's
character, background, history, mental and physical condition, and any other
facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems
to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall
be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
(3) Aggravating circumstances shall include those outlined in Section 76-5202. Mitigating circumstances shall include:
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(c) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial
domination of another person;
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirement of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental
disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs;
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide committed by
another person and his participation was relatively minor; and
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
(4) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty.
In all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed as to
the punishment to be imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death and that the
penalty of either life in prison or with regard to sentences to be imposed on or
after April 27, 1992, life in prison without parole, shall be imposed if a
unanimous verdict for death is not found. If the jury reports unanimous
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agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury
and shall impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to reach a
unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death, with regard to sentences to
be imposed on or after April 27, 1992, the court shall instruct the jury to
determine by a unanimous vote whether the penalty of life in prison without
parole shall be imposed. If the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court shall
discharge the jury and impose the sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is of death, the
appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only,
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court for
new sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or
errors. No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in the reversal of the
conviction of a capital felony. In cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly
admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings shall be admissible in
the new sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing proceeding was before a:
(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding;
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new sentencing
proceeding; or
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or unavailable to
conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then another judge shall be designated to conduct the new sentencing proceeding.
(6) In the event the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah
Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having
jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony
shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall
sentence the person to life in prison, if the death penalty is held unconstitutional prior to April 27, 1992, or life in prison without parole if the death
penalty is held unconstitutional on or after April 27, 1992, and any person who
is thereafter convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced to life in prison or
life in prison without parole.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-207, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-207; 1982, ch. 19, § 1;
1991,ch. 10,§ 6; 1992,ch. 142,§ 3.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "homicide" for "murder" in Subsections (2)(b),
(2)(d), and (2)(f) and made stylistic changes
throughout the section.
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27,
1992, substituted "sentencing proceedings regarding a capital offense" for "these sentencing
proceedings" in Subsection (2), designated the
former last sentence and the following subdivi-

sions therein as present Subsection (3), and
redesignated the succeeding subsections accordingly; substituted "wrongfulness"for "criminality (wrongfulness)" in Subsection (3)(d); in
Subsections (4) and (6), added the language
referring to the newly added sentencing provision of"life in prison without parole"; and made
stylistic changes throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Appeals to the Supreme Court where death sentences imposed,
procedure, Rule 26, U.R. Crim. P.
Execution of judgment of death, § 77-19-6 et
seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality of death penalty.
Constitutionality of statute.
-Admission of prior testimony.

Appeals.
-Required.
Applicability.
Comparison of aggravating and mitigating factors.
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Comparison with other capital cases.
Evidence.
-Aggravating factors.
-Juvenile offenses.
- Mitigating factors.
-Opinions of victim's associates.
-Other offenses.
- Prior homicide.
-Statements of attorneys.
- Victim impact evidence.
Factors in determining penalty.
Guilty plea.
-Conditional.
-Refusal to comply with agreement.
Life without parole.
-Prospective application.
Prejudicial error at penalty hearing.
Prerequisites to execution.
Psychiatric examinations.
Record.
Sequestering of jury.
Standard of proof.
Waiver of penalty hearing before jury.
Cited.

Constitutionality of death penalty.
The imposition of a death penalty is not
invariably "cruel and unusual punishment"; it
is not inhuman or barbarous in the sense that
torture would be, it is clearly supported by
much public sentiment, and its function in
vindicating society's outrage at particularly offensive conduct, along with the possibility that
it may deter some potential offenders from
committing capital crimes, serve as adequate
penological justifications for its imposition;
therefore, since the Georgia legislature could
not be said to have been clearly mistaken in its
determination that the death penalty was
needed, considerations of federalism required
the court to approve the penalty so long as it
was not disproportionate to the crime and it
was not arbitrarily imposed. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859,
rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 197,
50 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1976); also see concurring
opinions.
A claim that the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution had been violated by the
delay in imposition of the death penalty was
without merit where the delay was attributable
for the most part to aggressive attempts to
avoid the death penalty. Andrews v. Carver, 798
F. Supp. 659 (D. Utah 1992).
Constitutionality of statute.
Georgia statute which provided for a bifurcated hearing in capital cases, the first stage to
determine guilt or innocence and the second, if
necessary, to determine sentence, which directed the jury to consider any mitigating factors and provided it with a list often aggravating factors justifying imposition of the death
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penalty, and requiring automatic review of any
death sentence by the state supreme court,
contained sufficient standards for the guidance
of the jury to prevent the penalty from being
arbitrarily and capriciously imposed, and,
therefore, was constitutional. Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859,
rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97 S. Ct. 197
(1976); also see concurring opinions.
The statutory scheme for imposing the death
penalty as provided by this section is constitutional. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219,
58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
The fact that this section does not necessarily
require application of the exclusionary rules of
evidence does not render it unconstitutional.
State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980).
The Utah death penalty statute is constitutional. Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408 (D.
Utah 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d 1256 (10th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 919, 108 S. Ct.
1091, 99 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1988); Selby v. Shulsen,
600 F. Supp. 432 (D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 802 F.2d
1282 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1033, 107 S. Ct. 1964, 95 L. Ed. 2d 536, rehearing denied, 483 U.S. 1012, 107 S. Ct. 3246, 97 L.
Ed. 2d 750 (1987); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439
(Utah 1988); State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv.
Rep. 18 (Utah 1994).
Subsection (2) complies with the letter and
spirit of the federal constitutional requirements for imposition of the death penalty. The
only restriction on the admission of such evidence is that it must not be unfairly prejudicial
to the accused. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239
(Utah 1988), aff'd on reconsideration, 776 P.2d
631 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus granted and
judgment vacated, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
112 S. Ct. 1942, 118 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1992).
The death penalty as applied under the Utah
statutory scheme is in accordance with the
requirements of the state and federal constitutions. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah
1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988,459 U.S. 988,
110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).
This section does not violate Utah Const.,
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, although it was passed with
less than two-thirds majority vote, since the
statute was enacted twelve years before that
section was added to the Constitution and the
statute does not conflict with Rule 804(b)(l) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence because the Rules
of Evidence do not apply to sentencing proceedings. State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah 1994).

-Admission
of prior testimony.
To protect a capital defendant's confrontation
and due process rights under the provision of
this section permitting the use of a transcript of
prior testimony, the rule that the evidence must
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bear adequate "indicia of reliability" to be admissible is incorporated into the statute and, in
addition, the admission of prior testimony is
permitted in oral form only and the written
transcript should not be admitted as an exhibit
nor taken into the jury room, on condition that
the defendant makes timely objections to the
introduction of the transcript. State v. Carter,
233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1994).

Appeals.
In reviewing the imposition of the death
penalty in a capital case, Supreme Court has
the duty to determine whether the sentence of
death resulted from error, prejudice or arbitrariness, or was disproportionate. State v. Wood,
648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
On direct appeal in capital cases, Supreme
Court will review an error, even though no
proper objection was made at trial and even
though the error was not raised on appeal, if
the error was manifest and prejudicial. State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1982).
Supreme Court will review errors raised on
appeal in death penalty cases, even though no
proper objection was made at trial, but will
reverse a conviction based upon such errors
only if they meet the manifest and prejudicial
error standard. In addition, the court has the
power to notice manifest ("palpable") error apparent in the record and correct a conviction
based upon the same if the error is prejudicial,
even though such error is not objected to at trial
or assigned on appeal. State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), cert. denied, Tillman v.
Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d
671 (1994).
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality
review was not required in regard to defendant's contention that his sentence of death
was disproportionate to the crime committed,
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the
sentences meted out in other first-degree murder cases. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah
1987), cert. denied, Tillman v. Cook,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994);
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (1989).
-Required.
While Utah law does not compel a defendant
sentenced to death to utilize every procedure
that a defendant might voluntarily invoke, the
law does require one automatic appeal even
when "the defendant has chosen not to pursue
his own appeal." State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1989).

Comparison of aggravating and mitigat•
ing factors.
The burden of proof necessary for a verdict of
death over life imprisonment is on the state to
show that the totality of evidence of aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of
mitigating circumstances; state need not prove
absence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219,
58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
In comparing the totality of the mitigating
factors against the totality of the aggravating
factors, the comparison is not in terms of the
relative numbers of the aggravating and the
mitigating factors, but is in terms of their
respective substantiality and persuasiveness.
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed.
2d 383 (1982).
Comparison with other capital cases.
Over time, as the Supreme Court becomes
aware of a general pattern in the imposition of
the death penalty in this state, the court may
set aside death sentences that fall outside the
general pattern and thus reflect an anomaly in
the imposition of the death penalty. But that
does not mean that a defendant is entitled as a
matter of course to determine how the capital
sentencing scheme has been administered generally by trying to compare the facts and circumstances of capital cases on a case-by-case
basis. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989).
The claim of the failure to make a proportionality argument as to petitioner's death sentence
was without merit since a proportionality review comparing petitioner's sentence to others
is not constitutionally required under the
United States Constitution. The only issue is
whether the death penalty is proportionate to
the crime as measured by certain standards.
Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659 (D. Utah
1992).
A case-by-case or a comparison proportionality review of a judge's or jury's decision to
invoke the death penalty is not required under
state or federal law. State v. Carter, 233 Utah
Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1994).
Evidence.
-Aggravating factors.
Aggravating circumstances under this section include, but are not limited to, those listed
in § 76-5-202. Evidence of other aggravating
factors is not prohibited as long as that information is relevant to the character of the defendant or the circumstances of the crime.
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 3 (Utah 1989), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 965 (1990).
The factors defined in § 76-5-202 are aggra-

Applicability.
This section applies only to sentencing for
capital felonies. State v. Mitchell, 769 P.2d 817
(Utah 1989).
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capital homicide cases was not contrary to Utah
statutory requirements or guidelines set down
by the United States Supreme Court, nor was it
an abuse of discretion. State v. Gardner, 789
P.2d 3 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988,
110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).

vating factors and warrant consideration by the
jury in imposing the death penalty. Therefore,
the jury may properly consider these factors in
the penalty phase even when the factors were
not introduced during the guilt phase of the
trial. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Even though the facts of the case did not
justify consideration of heinousness as an aggravating factor, the trial court could consider
the nature and circumstances of the crime,
including its brutality, as an aggravating factor
at sentencing. State v. Menzies, 235 Utah Adv.
Rep. 23 (Utah 1994).

-Victim impact evidence.
Victim impact evidence is inadmissible under
Subsection (2). This ban on such evidence in
capital cases applies to evidence of the victim's
character, evidence of the effects of the crime on
the surviving members of the family, and evidence of the surviving members' opinions of the
crime. State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah 1994).

-Juvenile offenses.
Previous juvenile offenses, either adjudicated
or unadjudicated, may be brought in at the
penalty phase of the capital case. State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 1576, ll8 L. Ed. 2d 219
(1992).

Factors in determining penalty.
The brutality and ruthlessness of the crime
are proper factors to consider in determining
the penalty for one guilty of a capital felony.
State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 194 (1978). But see State v. Wood, two
paragraphs noted below.
The extended abuse of alcohol need not produce outright insanity before it is relevant in
the penalty phase of a capital offense trial;
diminished mental capacity short of legal insanity is a mitigating factor. State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988,
103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
In sentencing defendant to death for his
conviction of first degree murder for murder
committed in the course of a robbery, trial
court's reliance on the "ruthlessness and brutality" of the murder as the only aggravating
factor, without any indication in the record that
the robbery was considered in the weighing
process, was constitutionally impermissible
and flawed the sentencing process since such
factor describes all murders and fails to provide
any guideline for channeling discretion; as to
any class of capital murders under Utah law,
"ruthlessness and brutality" as an aggravating
factor must be limited to those murders involving an aggravated battery or torture. State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1982).
A two-step formula has been established for
deciding whether imprisonment
or death
should be the sentence. The first step is to
determine whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
beyond a reasonable doubt. The second step is
to determine whether the death penalty is
appropriate under all the circumstances of the
case and in light of the circumstances of the
defendant's background and life as a whole.
State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989).
After considering all aspects of the case, in
addition to the particular aggravating and miti-

-Mitigating factors.
Because by statute allocution is a right to
introduce a mitigating statement and because
capital defendants are entitled to present to the
sentencing jury any mitigating information,
courts must permit allocution at the sentencing
phase, when requested, rather than post-verdict. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).
Only young age - not old age - may be a
mitigating factor. State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
-Opinions of victim's associates.
Testimony offered regarding the opposition of
the victim's associates to the death penalty was
properly excluded as irrelevant to the character
of the accused or the nature of the crime. State
v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 3 (Utah 1989), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988, 110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965
(1990).
-Other offenses.
Even though the jury had made no findings
with regard to rape or attempted rape as an
aggravating circumstance at the guilt phase of
defendant's trial, rape-related evidence was admissible under Subsection (2) as relevant to the
nature and circumstances of the crime. State v.
Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1994).
-Prior homicide.
Where defendant had pleaded guilty to a
prior homicide after the commission of the
offense in the instant case but before trial, the
prior homicide was admissible under the plain
language of this section, even though it had not
yet resulted in a conviction. State v. Gardner,
789 P.2d 3 (Utah 1989), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
988, 110 S. Ct. 1837, 108 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990).
-Statements of attorneys.
Trial court's exclusion of affidavits of attorneys who qad appeared as counsel in other
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burden of proof at the penalty phase, these
prejudicial errors required that the defendant's
sentence be reduced from death to life imprisonment. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261 (Utah
1980). (Note that one of the concurring justices
felt that the penalty phase itself is unconstitutional.)

gating circumstances relied on by the state and
the defendant, the sentencing authority must
be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that
the imposition of the death penalty is "justified
and appropriate" in the circumstances. Thus,
the sentencing authority may refuse to impose
the death penalty even though it concedes that
the aggravating circumstances "outweigh" the
mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989).

Guilty plea.
-Conditional.
This section and Rule 11, U.R.Cr.P. permit a
trial judge to accept a guilty plea conditioned
upon the judge's promise not to impose the
death penalty. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294
(Utah 1986).
-Refusal to comply with agreement.
Considerations of fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause did not require
specific enforcement of a broken plea agreement. While the defendant acted in reliance on
the promise that he would not be sentenced to
death ifhe entered a guilty plea and gave a full
confession, that confession certainly could not
be used at a subsequent trial, nor could the
prosecution make use of the confession or any
evidence derived from it. The defendant's remedy was to either withdraw the guilty plea
given as part of the aborted plea agreement and
enter a new plea, or choose to stand on his
guilty plea and proceed to sentencing under the
provisions of this section with no guarantee as
to sentence. State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986).
Life without parole.
-Prospective
application.
There was no obligation that the state accord
retroactive effect to new substantive statutes
providing for a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole to allow a convicted person
sentenced to death the benefit of the new statute provisions where the conviction was final.
Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659 (D. Utah
1992).
Giving a convicted person sentenced to death
a more stringent life sentence without parole
when at the time of the crime the penalty, if
death were not imposed, would be life with the
chance of parole would violate the ex post facto
clause. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659 (D.
Utah 1992).

Prerequisites to execution.
Execution of a criminal defendant may not
occur until the Supreme Court determines at
least that the sentence is in accord with lawful
process. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah
1989).
Psychiatric examinations.
Although psychiatric assistance had been afforded defendant prior to trial, it was an abuse
of discretion for trial court to deny indigent
defendant's timely motion for psychiatric assistance in the penalty phase of a capital case
where it appeared there was not a full and
complete examination prior to trial because of
defendant's belief that the psychiatrist appointed was to be used to establish his defense
counsel's theory of defense, wp.ich was inconsistent with his own theory of defense, there was
evidence defendant was suffering from alcoholism and depression at the time of the offense,
and defendant's actions were not designed to
disrupt or unduly prolong the trial. State v.
Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L. Ed. 2d 383
(1982).
Record.
Given the procedures required at trial and
the careful appellate review given by the Supreme Court to death penalty cases over the
years, a specification of reasons by the sentencing authority on the record for imposing the
death penalty, even ifit were practicable, is not
necessary to prevent arbitrary and capricious
sentences. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019
(Utah 1989).
Sequestering of jury.
Whether to sequester the jury between the
guilt phase and the penalty phase of the trial is
within trial court's discretion. State v. Andrews,
574 P.2d 709 (Utah 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
Standard of proof.
Before the death penalty may be imposed,
the sentencing authority, after considering the
totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, must be persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and must be further
persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
imposition of the death penalty is justified and
appropriate after considering all the circumstances. State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981),

Prejudicial error at penalty hearing.
Where assistant county attorney inaccurately imputed an inflammatory obscenity to
the defendant in the penalty phase which constituted hearsay on hearsay and the court
failed to instruct adequately the jury on the
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cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S. Ct. 341, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 383 (1982).
State not only has the burden of persuading
the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that
the totality of the aggravating circumstances
outweighs the totality of the mitigating circumstances, but also has the burden of proving to
the sentencer beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant actually committed the violent
crime which is to be treated as an aggravating
factor. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988), aff'd on reconsideration, 776 P.2d
631 (Utah 1989), habeas corpus granted and
judgment vacated, Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d
1546 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
112 S. Ct. 1942, 118 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1992).
Trial judge committed plain error where,
after finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, he con-

76-3-207.5

eluded that the death penalty should be
imposed, without deciding whether, based on
all the circumstances, the death penalty was
justified and appropriate beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 {Utah
1989).

Waiver of penalty hearing before jury.
This section does not require that the prospective jurors be informed during voir dire
that the court will determine the penalty if the
defendants waive the hearing before the jury.
State v. Codianna, 573 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S. Ct. 219, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 194 (1978).
Cited in State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275
(Utah 1989); State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232
(Utah 1993); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516
(Utah 1994).
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Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was committed to avoid
arrest or prosecution, to effect escape from
custody, to hinder governmental function or
enforcement of law, and the like - post-Gregg
cases, 64 A.L.R.4th 755.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that in committing murder, defendant created risk of death or injury to more
than one person, to many persons, and the like
- post-Gregg cases, 64 A.L.R.4th 837.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
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penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant was previously convicted of or committed other violent offense,
had history of violent conduct, posed continuing
threat to society, and the like - post-Gregg
cases, 65 A.L.R.4th 838.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that murder was committed for pecuniary gain, as consideration or in expectation
of receiving something of monetary value, and
the like - post-Gregg cases, 66 A.L.R.4th 417.
Sufficiency of evidence, for death penalty
purposes, to establish statutory aggravating
circumstance that murder was committed in
course of committing, attempting, or fleeing
from other offense, and the like - post-Gregg
cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 887.
Sufficiency of evidence, for purposes of death
penalty, to establish statutory aggravating circumstance that defendant committed murder
while under sentence of imprisonment, in confinement or correctional custody, and the like post-Gregg cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 942.
Propriety of imposing capital punishment on
mentally retarded individuals, 20 A.L.R.5th
177.
Propriety under Federal Constitution of evidence or argument concerning deterrent effect
of death penalty, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 553.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law <S==>1219.

Effect on sentencing

-

Op-

(1) The sentencing option of life without parole provided in Sections 76-3201 and 76-3-207 applies only to those capital offenses for which the offender
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is sentenced on or after April 27, 1992. The sentencing option of life without
parole provided in Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207 has no effect on sentences
imposed in capital cases prior to April 27, 1992.
(2) An offender, who commits a capital offense prior to April 27, 1992, but is
sentenced on or after April 27, 1992, shall be given the option, prior to a
sentencing hearing pursuant to Section 76-3-207, to proceed either under the
law which was in effect at the time the offense was committed or under the
additional sentencing option of life in prison without parole provided in
Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-207 .5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 142, § 4.
Effective Dates. - Laws 1992, ch. 142

became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

NOTES TO DECISIONS

Application.
- Not retroactive.
The sentencing option of life without parole
provided for in this section had no application
in proceedings before the district court to review a death sentence, imposed by a jury before
the enactment of this section, for the purpose of
determining if any legal cause existed against
execution of the judgment of death. State v.
Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1992).
There was no obligation that the state accord
retroactive effect to new substantive statutes

76-3-208.

Imprisonment

providing for a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole to allow a convicted person
sentenced to death the benefit of the new statute provisions. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp.
659 (D. Utah 1992).
Giving a convicted person sentenced to death
a more stringent life sentence without parole
when at the time of the crime the penalty, if
death were not imposed, would be life with the
chance of parole would violate the ex post facto
clause. Andrews v. Carver, 798 F. Supp. 659 (D.
Utah 1992).

- Custodial authorities.

(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed to the following
custodial authorities:
(a) Felony commitments shall be to the Utah State Prison;
(b) Class A misdemeanor commitments may be to the Utah State Prison
if the defendant consents;
(c) Misdemeanor commitments shall be to the jail, or other facility
designated by the town, city or county where the defendant was convicted.
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility other than the
one to which he was committed when:
(a) It does not have space to accommodate him; or
(b) The security of the institution or inmate requires it.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-208, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 31.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law
1000.

§ 607.

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1570.
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PARTS
FINES AND SPECIAL SANCTIONS
76-3-301.

Fines of persons.

(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay a fine, not
exceeding:
(a) $10,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the first degree or
second degree;
(b) $5,000 when the conviction is of a felony of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 when the conviction is of a class A misdemeanor;
(d) $1,000 when the conviction is of a class B misdemeanor;
(e) $750 when the conviction is of a class C misdemeanor or infraction;
and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association, partnership,
government, or governmental instrumentality.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-301, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-301; 1986, ch. 178, § 63;
1988, ch. 152, § 14; 1991, ch. 241, § 90.

Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted
"$750" for "$500" in Subsection (l)(e).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

§ 613.

76-3-301.5.

Uniform fine schedule

- Judicial

€:,,

1206(1).

Council.

(1) The Judicial Council shall establish a uniform recommended fine schedule for each offense under Subsection 76-3-301(1).
(a) The fine for each offense shall proportionally reflect the seriousness
of the offense and other factors as determined in writing by the Judicial
Council.
(b) The schedule shall be reviewed annually by the Judicial Council.
(c) The fines shall be collected under Section 77-18-1.
(2) The schedule shall incorporate:
(a) criteria for determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances;
and
(b) guidelines for enhancement or reduction of the fine, based on
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
(3) Presentence investigation reports shall include documentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as determined under the criteria, and a
recommended fine under the schedule.
(4) The Judicial Council shall also establish a separate uniform recommended fine schedule for the juvenile court and by rule provide for its
implementation.
(5) This section does not prohibit the court from in its discretion imposing no
fine, or a fine in any amount up to and including the maximum fine, for the
offense.
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-301.5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 152, § 15.

76-3-302.

Cross-References. - Fine/bail schedule,
Appx. C, Code of Judicial Administration.

Fines of corporations,
associations,
ships, or government instrumentalities.

partner-

The sentence to pay a fine, when imposed upon a corporation, association,
partnership, or governmental instrumentality for an offense defined in this
code or for an offense defined outside this code for which no special corporate
fine is specified shall be to pay an amount, fixed by the court, not exceeding:
(1) $20,000 when the conviction is for a felony;
(2) $10,000 when the conviction is for a class A misdemeanor;
(3) $5,000 when the conviction is for a class B misdemeanor; and
(4) $1,000 when the conviction is for a class C misdemeanor or for an
infraction.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-302, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-302; 1986, ch. 178, § 64.
Cross-References. - Procedure for crimi-

nal action against corporation, Rule 4(k), R.
Crim. P.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

76-3-303.

1206(1).

Additional sanctions against corporation or association - Advertising of conviction - Disqualification of officer.

(1) When a corporation or association is convicted of an offense, the court
may, in addition to or in lieu of imposing other authorized sanctions, require
the corporation or association to give appropriate publicity of the conviction by
notice to the class or classes of persons or section of the public interested in or
affected by the conviction, by advertising in designated areas, or by designated
media or otherwise.
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a corporation or
association is convicted of an offense committed in furtherance of the affairs of
the corporation or association, the court may include in the sentence an order
disqualifying him from exercising similar functions in the same or other
corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five years if it finds
the scope or willfulness of his illegal actions make it dangerous or inadvisable
for such functions to be entrusted to him.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-303, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-303.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law~

1206(1).
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PART4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401.

Concurrent
tions.

or consecutive

sentences

- Limita-

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of
them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the
defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
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History: C. 1953, 76-3-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-401; 1974, ch. 32, § 7;
1989,ch. 181,§ 1;1994,ch. 13,§ 21.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "30

years imprisonment" for "30 years' imprisonment" in Subsection (4) and substituted "Board
of Pardons and Parole" for "Board of Pardons"
in Subsection (6).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Commencement of second sentence.
Concurrent sentences.
Consecutive sentences.
Mitigating circumstances.
Sentences imposed by different states.
Commencement of second sentence.
Sentence upon conviction of second offense
could not begin later than termination of first;
court properly sentenced defendant to serve
additional five years on conviction of perjury, to
commence upon expiration of life sentence
which defendant was already serving. State v.
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 P.2d 781 (1967).
Concurrent sentences.
When the trial court declined to determine
whether defendant's sentences would run concurrently or consecutively and, instead, left
"that decision to the Division of Corrections,"
the trial court's delegation to the Department of
Corrections of the responsibilities given to it
under this section was inappropriate, but the
error was harmless in light of the express
language of the statute, providing that the
sentences run concurrently. State v. Hallett,
796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 856
P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).
Consecutive sentences.
The court did not err in imposing consecutive
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault,
even though both were committed in the course
of a single criminal episode, where the evidence
clearly showed that a sufficiently substantial
period of time had elapsed, both before and
after the sexual assault, in which the victim
was restrained against her will and subjected
to a substantial risk of harm. State v. Jolivet,
712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986); State v. Stettina, 868
P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Trial court did not err in imposing four consecutive sentences for second-degree murder,
attempted murder and two counts of aggravated assault arising out of a barroom altercation, because defendant committed four separate and distinct crimes involving different
victims. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App.
1989).
This section does not preclude the imposition
of consecutive sentences, but merely restricts
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the effect of consecutive sentences. State v.
Swapp, 808 P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991).
The purpose of a statute limiting consecutive
sentences is to guard against. oppressive and
inequitably long sentences. State v. Swapp, 808
P.2d 115 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 815 P.2d
241 (Utah 1991).
This section does not preclude the imposition
of consecutive sentences that total more than
thirty years, but restricts the actual time
served to a maximum of thirty years. State v.
Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v.
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
This section does not prohibit the imposition
of consecutive sentences not carrying a maximum of life in prison from exceeding thirty
years. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).
Although the first portion of Subsection (4)
limits the aggregate maximum of consecutive
sentences to thirty years' imprisonment, when
read in conjunction with the second portion,
this limitation does not apply if any of the
sentences imposed that are part of the consecutive sentence chain authorizes the death penalty or life imprisonment. When seven of nine
offenses authorized life imprisonment, Subsection (4) did not apply. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431
(Utah 1993).
Mitigating circumstances.
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who
pied guilty to first degree murder, child kidnapping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child to
consecutive sentences, trial court abused its
discretion in failing to consider the defendant's
rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme
youth and the absence of prior violent crimes.
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993).
Only young age - not old age - may be a
mitigating factor. State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Sentences imposed by different states.
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are
to run concurrently unless the court states to
the contrary in the sentence, does not apply to
sentences imposed by two different sovereigns,
and, therefore, such sentences should run consecutively unless the sentencing court expressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709
P.2d 391 (Utah 1985).
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law

§ 552.

C.J.S. 1523.

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

<,;:a>1210.

24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522,

76-3-402.

Conviction

of lower degree of offense.

(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing ifrequested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6;
1991, ch. 7, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, twice substituted
"degree" for "category" in Subsection (1), inserted "third degree" and "class A" in the introductory paragraph of Subsection (2), twice inserted "class .N' in Subsection (2)(a), added the

subsection designations in Subsection (2)(b),
added Subsections (2)(b)(iii) and (3), redesignated former Subsection (3) as present Subsection (4), and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section.
Cross-References. - Expungement and
sealing of records, § 77-18-9 et seq.; Rule
4-207, Rules of Judicial Administration.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Appeal.
When a conviction is reduced under this
section, the appeal lies in the court having
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in
the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of

ANALYSIS

Appeal.
Applicabilityof 1991 amendment.
Felonies.
Cited.
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crime charged in the information or found in
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 (Utah
1991).

Applicability of 1991 amendment.
Where the trial court had granted defendant's motion under the 1990 version of this
section and entered a conviction for the next
lower category of the offense for which she had
been charged, she was not entitled to a second
reduction after she completed a period of probation because, by that time, the 1991 amendment of this section applied, preventing a second reduction without prosecutorial consent.

State v. Shipler, 869 P.2d 968 (Utah Ct. App.
1994).

Felonies.
Court erred in reducing defendant's two felony convictions to class A misdemeanor convictions instead of to class B misdemeanor convictions. See State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Cited in State v. Duncan, 812 P.2d 60 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991); United States v. Short, 947 F.2d
1445 (10th Cir. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law

76-3-403.

,s:;,

1208(2).

Credit for good behavior
misdemeanor.

against sentence

for

In any commitment to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense the custodial authority may in its discretion and upon good behavior of the inmate allow
up to ten days' credit against the sentence to be served for every 30 days served
or up to two days' credit for every ten days served when the period to be served
is less than 30 days.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-403, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-403; 1989, ch. 55, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1571.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law ,s:;, 1216(1).

76-3-404.

Presentence
investigation
and diagnostic
evaluation - Commitment of defendant - Sentencing procedure.

(1) (a) (i) In felony cases where the court is of the opinion imprisonment
may be appropriate but desires more detailed information as a basis
for determining the sentence to be imposed than has been provided by
the presentence report, the court may in its discretion commit a
convicted defendant to the custody of the Department of Corrections
for a diagnostic evaluation for a period not exceeding 90 days.
(ii) The Department of Corrections shall conduct a complete study
and evaluation of the defendant during that time, inquiring into
matters including:
(A) the defendant's previous delinquency or criminal experience;
(B) his social background;
(C) his capabilities;
(D) his mental, emotional, and physical health; and
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(E) the rehabilitative resources or programs which may be
available to suit his needs.
(b) (i) By the expiration of the commitment period, or by the expiration
of additional commitment time the court may grant, not exceeding a
further period of90 days, the defendant shall be returned to the court
for sentencing and the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his
attorney shall be provided with a written diagnostic evaluation report
of results of the study, including any recommendations the Department of Corrections or the Utah State Hospital believes will be helpful
to a proper resolution of the case.
(ii) Any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court is supplemental to and becomes a part of the presentence investigation report.
(iii) After receiving the diagnostic evaluation report and recommendations, the court shall proceed to sentence a defendant in
accordance with the sentencing alternatives provided under Section
76-3-201.
i"·.
(2) Any commitment for presentence investigation under this section does
not constitute a commitment to prison. However, any person who is committed
to prison following proceedings under this section shall be given credit against
his sentence for the time spent in confinement for a presentence investigation
report.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by L.
1973, ch.196, § 76-3-404; 1985, ch. 212, § 14;
1989, ch. 245, § 6; 1991, ch. 206, § 5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 1991, assigned the
designations (i) and (ii)(A) through (ii)(E) in
Subsection (l)(a), assigned the designations (i)
through (iii) in Subsection (l)(b), inserted ref-

erences to "diagnostic evaluation" and "evaluation" in Subsections (l)(a) and (l)(b), deleted
"The Department of Corrections may contract
with the Utah State Hospital to conduct all or a
portion of that study" from Subsection
(l)(a)(ii)(E), inserted Subsection (l)(b)(ii), and
made several stylistic changes throughout Subsection (1).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
dant to prison. State v. Carson, 597 P.2d 862
(Utah 1979).
The decision to order an additional evaluation lies within the discretion of the trial court,
and unless there is a showing in the record of
an abuse of discretion, the appellate court will
affirm the sentence. State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1
(Utah 1988).
It is within the sound discretion of the trial
court to order an evaluation before passing
sentence, and the appellate court will not disturb a sentence unless the record clearly shows
an abuse of that discretion. State v. Russell, 772
P.2d 971 (1989); State v. Brown, 771 P.2d 1067
(1989).
The law does not compel a trial court to order
a 90-day evaluation merely because it would
have given the judge more information on
which to base the sentence. State v. Gentlewind, 844 P.2d 372 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

ANALYSIS

Discretion of trial court.
Juvenile record.
Rescinding recommendation for evaluation.
Discretion of trial court.
Whether trial judge elects to order an evaluation before passing sentence is within his
discretion; where judge stated, when defendant
appeared before him for sentencing, that he
would refer matter for a 90-day evaluation
whereupon defendant attempted to escape from
the courtroom, it was not an abuse of discretion
forjudge to rescind his recommendation for the
evaluation and proceed to sentence defendant;
the original recommendation, made orally, was
not part of the judgment and was not appealable. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah
1978).
Trial court had discretion to ignore corrections division's request for a second 90-day
diagnostic period in which to determine defendant's suitability for long-term treatment in
sexual offender program and to sentence defen-

Juvenile record.
Section 78-3a-44 prohibiting admission of juvenile court record into evidence in proceedings
in any other court does not preclude inclusion of
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an adult. defendant's juvenile history in the
pre-sentence report and its consideration by
the sentencing judge; the section prohibits use
of the juvenile record in the guilt phase of a
criminal trial, but not in the sentencing phase.
State v. McClendon, 611 P.2d 728 (Utah 1980).

for the 90-day evaluation and impose the
proper prison sentence when the oral recommendation has not been made part of the judgment and, since it is not part of the judgment,
its rescission is not appealable. State v.
Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978).

Rescinding recommendation for evaluation.
Judge may rescind his oral recommendation
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 21Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 596.
C.J.S. - 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 1506.

76-3-405.

A.L.R. - Defendant's right to disclosure of
presentence report, 40 A.L.R.3d 681.
Key Numbers. - Criminal Law 4l;=> 1208(2).

Limitation on sentence
prior sentence set aside.

where

conviction

or

Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside on direct review or on
collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence for the same
offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct which is more
severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior sentence previously
satisfied.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-405.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
that he was required to appear at trial in prison
clothing, which allegation if true would constitute a violation of his constitutional due process
rights. Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah
1980).

ANALYSIS

Appeal to district court from justice court.
Attorney's misstatement of law.
Finality of sentence.
In general.
Purpose of section.
Second sentence less severe.
Second sentence more severe.
Cited.

Appeal to district court from justice court.
At a trial de novo in district court on appeal
from a conviction in a justice court, district
court could not sentence defendant upon conviction to a more severe sentence than imposed
by justice court. Wisden v. District Court, 694
P.2d 605 (Utah 1984), aff'd, 737 P.2d 981 (Utah
1987).
Attorney's misstatement of law.
Defendant's allegation that he failed to appeal his conviction due to his attorney's advice
that he stood a substantial chance of receiving
a much harsher sentence upon a retrial, such
advice being a misstatement of the law as
provided by this section, entitled defendant to
challenge his conviction by a petition for writ of
habeas corpus where defendant also alleged
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Finality of sentence.
Concurrent sentences orally ordered by
judge, but not signed in order to continue
sentencing hearing for reconsideration of sentence, were not "set aside" on direct review or
collateral attack within the meaning of this
section. Therefore, the court's later imposition
of consecutive sentences did not violate this
section. State v. Curry, 814 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
In general.
This section's prohibition against a more severe second sentence requires that the second
sentence cannot exceed the first sentence in
appearance or effect, in the number of its elements or in their magnitude; therefore, concerning the second sentence, no new element of
sentence can be added, no element can be
augmented in magnitude, and there can be no
tradeoff by increasing one element of a sentence by reference to a decrease in another
element. State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah
1981).

PUNISHMENTS

Purpose of section.
The purpose behind this section is to prevent
the chilling effect on the constitutional right to
appeal which the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might be
able to demonstrate reversible error in his
conviction. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah
1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 883,
116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992).
This section was intended to protect the right
of a criminal defendant to appeal, not to prevent the correction of a sentence unlawfully
imposed. State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah
1991), cert. denied,
U.S.
, 112 S. Ct. 883,
116 L. Ed. 2d 787 (1992).
The legislative intent behind this section is to
protect an accused's constitutional right to appeal without having to face the possibility of a
harsher sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d
469 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Second sentence less severe.
Defendant's second sentence of one to fifteen
years plus one to five years and a $10,000 fine
was less severe when viewed in toto than his
first sentence of life imprisonment. This was so

76-3-406

even though the first sentence did not include
components analogous to aspects of the second
sentence. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469 (Utah
Ct. App. 1991).

Second sentence more severe.
Defendant's second sentence, imposed after a
successful appeal of his first conviction and a
second conviction on retrial, was more severe
than the first sentence and was therefore prohibited by this section where following his first
conviction, defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15
years in the penitentiary, but execution of that
sentence was stayed and he was placed on two
years' probation on the condition that he serve
six months in the county jail and pay full
restitution and, after his second conviction,
defendant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years in the
penitentiary without requiring restitution, but
with service of sentence to begin without delay.
State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179 (Utah 1981).
Cited in Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873 (Utah
1990); State v. Carter, 233 Utah Adv. Rep. 18
(Utah 1994).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Key Numbers. - Criminal Law cg:, 260(13).

A.L.R. - Propriety of increased punishment
on new trial for same offense, 12 A.L.R.3d 978.
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Crimes for which probation, suspension of sentence, lower category of offense, or hospitalization is restricted - Exception.

(1) Notwithstanding Sections 76-3-201 and 77-18-1, and Title 77, Chapter
16, except as provided in Section 76-5-406.5, probation shall not be granted,
the execution or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, the court shall
not enter a judgment for a lower category of offense, and hospitalization shall
not be ordered, the effect of which would in any way shorten the prison
sentence for any person who commits a felony of the first degree involving:
(a) Section 76-5-301.1, child kidnapping;
(b) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;
(c) Section 76-5-402.1, rape of a child;
(d) Section 76-5-402.3, object rape of a child;
(e) Section 76-5-403.1, sodomy on a child;
(f) Subsections 76-5-404.1(3) and (4), aggravated sexual abuse of a
child;
(g) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; or
(h) any attempt to commit a felony listed in Subsections (l)(c) through
(l)(f).
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), any person chargeable with a crime
referred to in Subsection (1) who, within 90 days after May 10, 1983,
voluntarily surrenders, not as a result of a complaint, warrant, or investigation, to a peace officer of the community in which the conduct took place and
fully discloses the circumstances surrounding the conduct, may in the discre87
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tion of the court be convicted of a lower category of offense, be granted
probation, have execution of sentence suspended, or be hospitalized, or any
combination of these.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-406, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 7; 1984, ch. 18, § 2; 1986, ch.
41, § 1; 1994, ch. 64, § 1.
Amendment Notes. - The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted "and any

other provision oflaw" after "Title 77, Chapter
16" near the beginning of Subsection (1) and
rewrote the list of specific crimes in Subsection
(1) as Subsections (l)(a) to (l)(h).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Sexual crime against child.
Cited.

Constitutionality.
The minimum mandatory sentencing scheme
set forth in Subsections 76-5-404.1(4), 76-3201(5), 76-3-406(1), and 77-27-9(2) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Gerrish, 746
P.2d 762 (Utah 1987).

against a child can receive probation or reduction of sentence only if he satisfies all the
enumerated requirements of§ 76-5-406.5. If a
defendant does not meet all the requirements,
this section precludes the granting of probation
under any other statute. State v. Gibbons, 779
P.2d 1133 (1989).

Cited in State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah
1986); Herman v. State, 821 P.2d 457 (Utah
1991).

Sexual crime against child.
A defendant convicted of a sexual crime

76-3-407.

Repeat and habitual sex offenders-Additional
prison term for prior felony convictions.

Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, if the new offense is an attempt
to commit or the commission of a felony of the first or second degree described
in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, the court shall impose in addition to and
consecutive with any other prison term therefor, a three year term for each
prior conviction for a felony sexual offense in Utah or any other state or federal
jurisdiction which conetitutes or would constitute a crime, assault with intent
to commit a crime, or an attempt to commit a crime which, if committed in
Utah, is punishable under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, if the existence of the
felony conviction has been charged and admitted or found true in the action for
the new offense and if the prior felony conviction was entered before the
commission of the new offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-407, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 8; 1984, ch. 18, § 3.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. - Binding Sentencing
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's
Prison Population, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 309.
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Repeat and habitual sex offenders - Life imprisonment without parole on third conviction.

Notwithstanding any other provision oflaw, a person who has been convicted
in two or more separate prosecutions of any sexual offense which, if committed
in Utah or any other state or federal jurisdiction, would contain elements
sufficient to constitute any of the offenses described in Sections 76-5-402,
76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1,
and 76-5-405, shall, upon a conviction of any offense set forth in this section, be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole if
the existence of the prior felony convictions has been charged and admitted or
found true in the action for the new offense and if the prior felony convictions
were entered before the commission of the new offense. A prior felony
conviction can be alleged for purposes of this section only if it was entered
before the actual commission of the crime which constitutes the basis for the
next felony conviction, subsequently entered against the accused, which is also
alleged under this section.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-408, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 88, § 9; 1984, ch. 18, § 4.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. - Binding Sentencing
Guidelines: A Means of Controlling Utah's
Prison Population, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 309.

76-3-409.

Child abuse or sex offense against child
Treatment of offender or victim - Payment
costs.

of

(1) Any person convicted in the district court of child abuse, or a sexual
offense if the victim is under 18 years of age, may be ordered to participate in
treatment or therapy under the supervision of the adult probation and parole
section of the Department of Corrections, in cooperation with the division of
children, youth, and families until the court is satisfied that such treatment or
therapy has been successful or that no further benefit to the convicted offender
would result if such treatment or therapy were continued. The court may also
order treatment of the victim if it believes the same would be beneficial under
the circumstances. Nothing in this section shall preclude the court from
imposing any additional sentence as provided by law.
(2) The convicted offender shall be ordered to pay, to the extent that he or
she is able, the costs of his or her treatment, together with treatment costs
incurred by the victim and any administrative costs incurred by the appropriate state agency in the supervision of such treatment. If the convicted offender
is unable to pay all or part of the costs of treatment, the court may order the
appropriate state agency to pay such costs to the extent funding is provided by
the Legislature for such purpose and shall order the convicted offender to
perform public service work as compensation for the cost of treatment.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-409, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 115, § 1; 1985, ch. 212, § 15.
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PART5
FORFEITURE
76-3-501.

Vehicle subject to forfeiture
cedure.

-

Seizure -

Pro-

(1) Any vehicle used in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight after
commission of any felony in which a firearm, incendiary device, or other
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501 is used, or any vehicle used
in the commission of the illegal possession or sale of a firearm in or from the
vehicle, is subject to forfeiture and no property right exists in it if the owner of
the vehicle was a knowing participant in the offense or voluntarily allowed the
vehicle to be used, knowing that it would probably be used to commit the
offense.
(2) Any forfeiture of a vehicle subject to a bona fide security interest is
subject to the interest of a secured party who could not have known in the
exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation would or did take place in the
use of the vehicle.
(3) Vehicles subject to forfeiture under this section may be seized by any
peace officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction
over the vehicle. However, seizure without process may be made when:
(a) the seizure is incident to a lawful arrest, with or without an arrest
warrant;
(b) the vehicle is seized incident to a lawful search with or without a
search warrant or an inspection under an administrative inspection
warrant;
(c) the vehicle subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior
judgment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture
proceeding; or
(d) the peace officer seizing the vehicle has probable cause to believe
that the vehicle has been used or is intended to be used in violation of this
section and the peace officer reasonably believes that the vehicle will be
lost, damaged, or used in further violation of law if the officer delays
seizure to obtain a warrant.
(4) In the event of seizure under Subsection (3), proceedings under Subsection (5) shall be instituted promptly.
(5) Any vehicle taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is
in custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to
the orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When a
vehicle is seized under this chapter the appropriate person or agency may:
(a) remove the vehicle to a place designated by the court, official, or the
warrant under which the vehicle was seized; or
(b) take custody of the vehicle and remove it to an appropriate location
for disposition in accordance with law.
(6) When any vehicle is subject to forfeiture, determination for forfeiture to
the state shall be made as follows:
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the
county attorney, or if within a prosecution district the district attorney,
where the vehicle was seized or is to be seized. The complaint shall be filed
in the district court where the vehicle was seized. The complaint shall
describe with reasonable particularity the:
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(i) vehicle which is the subject matter of the proceeding;
(ii) date and place of seizure, if known; and
(iii) allegations which constitute the basis for forfeiture.
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the court shall forthwith issue
a warrant for the seizure of the vehicle which is the subject matter of the
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service upon the seizing person or
agency.
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all
persons known to the county attorney or district attorney to have a claim
in the vehicle by one of the following methods:
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right,
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by
mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to the
address given upon the records of the division, which service is
considered complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be
forwarded; and
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but
who are believed to have an interest in the vehicle, by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the seizure
was made.
(d) Any claimant or interested party shall file with the court a verified
answer to the complaint within 20 days after service has been obtained.
(e) When a vehicle is seized under this section, any interested person or
claimant of the vehicle, prior to being served with a complaint under this
section, may file a petition in the court having jurisdiction for release of his
interest in the vehicle. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest in
the vehicle and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served upon
the county attorney or, if within a prosecution district the district attorney,
in the county of the seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20 days.
A petitioner under this subsection need not answer a complaint of
forfeiture.
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release,
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present
evidence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the
vehicle as the court determines. If the county attorney or district attorney
has not filed an answer to a petition for release and the court determines
from the evidence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the
vehicle, it shall enter an order directing the county attorney or district
attorney to answer the petition within ten days. If no answer is filed
within that period, the court shall order the release of the vehicle to the
petitioner entitled to receive it.
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the
end of 20 days, the court shall promptly set the matter for hearing. At this
hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights of
release of the vehicle following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The court
shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the case
and order forfeiture or release of the vehicle as it determines.
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under the laws of this state.
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(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the
vehicle in whole or in part, it shall declare the vehicle to be forfeited and
direct it to be delivered for disposition in accordance with Subsection (7).
(j) When the court determines that the vehicle, in whole or in part, is
not subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the vehicle to the proper
claimant. If the court determines that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture in
part and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial
forfeiture. When the vehicle cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and
release, the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed:
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants;
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure,
storage of the vehicle, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture,
and costs of sale; and
(iii) third, in accordance with Subsection (7).
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture
proceeding, including seizure and storage of the vehicle, against the
individual or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture,
and may assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the
vehicle as appropriate.
(7) When any vehicle is forfeited under this section by a finding of the court
that no person is entitled to recover it or that the vehicle is subject to forfeiture
in part and release in part to a claimant, a court shall order that the vehicle be
delivered to the seizing agency for sale as the court directs. The court shall also
order that the proceeds from the sale of the vehicle be distributed in accordance
with the provisions of Subsection (6)(j).
(8) When the court orders that a vehicle be forfeited, in whole or in part,
under this section, it shall direct that the proceeds from the sale of the forfeited
vehicle, or part thereof, be divided or distributed as follows:
(a) % to tµ.e agency making the seizure; and
(b) ¼ to the state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
(9) If the vehicle is found by the court not to be subject to forfeiture, it shall
be released to the owner.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-501, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 258, § 1.

Effective Dates. - Laws 1994, ch. 258, § 2
makes the act effective on March 21, 1994.
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Attempt - Classification of offenses.
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76-4-203.
76-4-204.

Conspiracy - Classification of offenses.
Criminal solicitation - Elements.
Criminal solicitation - Penalties.

of of-

92

76-4-301.

Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails.

